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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
JAMES DOUGLAS TYLER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 910118 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant James Douglas Tyler appeals his conviction of 
aggravated arson, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-103 (1990), in the Third Judicial District 
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, Utah, the Honorable Timothy 
R. Hanson, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction over the 
appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (Supp. 1991). 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Did defendant receive ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel? When appealed following trial court proceedings on 
counsel ineffectiveness, this issue is a mixed one of law and 
fact. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697-98 (1984) 
(review following habeas corpus proceeding); State v. Templin. 
805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990) (reviewing denial of motion for new 
trial). However, when raised for the first time on appeal, the 
question of trial counsel ineffectiveness appears to be one of 
law, requiring the appellate court to examine the record of the 
original trial, and decide de novo whether counsel's conduct was 
so deficient "that the trial cannot be relied upon as having 
produced a just result." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. In either 
event, defendant must affirmatively show both that trial 
counsel's performance was objectively deficient, and that such 
deficient performance was prejudicial. JEd. at 687; State v. 
Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 118-19 & n.2 (Utah 1989). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides as follows: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and 
to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his 
defence. 
The text of other relevant constitutional, statutory, and rule 
provisions relevant to this appeal will be contained in the body 
of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was convicted of aggravated arson, a first 
degree felony, following a jury trial. He moved for a new trial, 
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court 
denied the motion without a hearing, and sentenced defendant to 
five years to life at the Utah State Prison (R. 94, 132-33). On 
appeal, defendant reasserts his claim that he was ineffectively 
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represented at trial, in violation of his constitutional right to 
counsel• 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State's fact recitation is in two parts. The 
evidence supporting the conviction is first presented, as 
elicited in the trial of this case. Because defense counsel 
ineffectiveness is alleged on appeal, a separate recitation of 
defense counsel efforts then follows. 
The Fire 
This case involves a fire in the apartment of 
defendant's former wife, Katherine Tyler, on July 1, 1990 (R. 117 
at 164; R. 116 at 11-12). Mrs. Tyler testified that on that day, 
defendant came to her apartment, drunk, and started a noisy 
argument (R. 117 at 165). Mrs. Tyler attacked defendant with a 
baseball bat; he retreated, telling Mrs. Tyler, "You'll pay, I'll 
kill your dog, and I'll burn your house" (id.)* Defendant then 
announced that he was going to buy some beer, and that he would 
be back (R. 117 at 166). 
Taking her dog, Mrs. Tyler went to a neighbor's home 
and called the police (id.). Before police arrived, defendant 
returned; Mrs. Tyler saw him walk down an alley toward the back 
of her home (id. at 168). 
Police officer Richard Walton first responded to Mrs. 
Tyler's call, which had been reported to him as an "unwanted 
guest situation" (id. at 91). He found Mrs. Tyler at the 
neighbor's house, and she told him that defendant had left her 
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home, but then returned (id. at 94). Officer Walton therefore 
accompanied Mrs. Tyler back to her home, to make sure that the 
premises were secure (id. at 94, 169). 
As Walton and Mrs. Tyler approached, defendant emerged 
from the alley next to the home and began walking briskly away, 
down the street (id,, at 94, 170). By radio, Walton ordered a 
just-arrived backup officer to stop defendant (id.)* Mrs. Tyler 
then exclaimed that her home was on fire (id.). Officer Walton 
entered the home and discovered a blaze in the kitchen, burning 
atop or around the refrigerator (ici. at 94-96). He exited the 
smokey home and radioed the fire department (id. at 96). 
Meanwhile, the backup officer had apprehended 
defendant, over some resistance (id., at 100, 106). Defendant 
told the officers that he had just been "walking around in the 
area," and had not been inside the home, but also said that he 
lived there (jjd. at 101 J.1 He was carrying a work 
identification tag belonging to Mrs. Tyler as well as a set of 
keys to her home and car (id. at 97, 102, 171). Defendant 
claimed the keys were his, but told the officers that he "didn't 
know about the identification" (id. at 102). Mrs. Tyler stated 
that she had left the identification tag in her home after 
returning from work that day (id., at 171). The officers arrested 
defendant (id. at 96). 
*Mrs. Tyler testified at trial that defendant did not live 
with her, and that he had not been invited to her home on the day 
of the fire (R. 117 at 164-65). 
4 
Firefighters quickly extinguished the fire (id. at 
109). Within half an hour, a fire department investigator 
arrived to examine the scene (.id. at 109, 113). The investigator 
took at least seventeen photographs, and seized physical evidence 
including a paint thinner can found near the back of the home 
(id. at 114-15). He determined that the fire had two points of 
origin—behind and on top of the refrigerator (id. at 117, 142-
43). He eliminated all possible accidental causes, such as 
electrical problems, defective appliances, or pilot light-caused 
explosions (id. at 118-19, 122-23, 126-27, 131). 
The can of paint thinner was examined for fingerprints; 
however, defendant's prints were not on the can (R. 117 at 124-
25). The fire department investigator, however, believed that 
some type of accelerant, poured at the base of and behind Mrs. 
Tyler's refrigerator, had been used (id. at 127-29, 143). He was 
unable to tell whether the seized paint thinner or some other 
accelerant had been used, because the substance had been consumed 
in the flames and diluted by firefighting efforts (id. at 138-
39). Other "ordinary material" sitting atop the refrigerator had 
been separately ignited to form the second point of the fire's 
origin (id. at 130-31). The investigator therefore concluded: 
"My opinion of the fire is that it's intentionally set with two 
points of origin by hand-held flame" (id., at 132, 143). 
The Defense 
Defendant was charged with aggravated arson (R. 6-7). 
Nancy Bergeson of the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
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entered her appearance as defense counsel nine days after 
defendant's arrest; she promptly served a discovery request upon 
the prosecution (R. 14-16). Several weeks later, however, 
Bergeson withdrew, due to a conflict of interest between the 
Legal Defender Association and defendant (R. 23-24). That 
conflict had arisen from an altercation between defendant and 
another Legal Defender staff member (July 27, 1990 memorandum, 
copied at Appendix B to Br. of Appellant; R. 115 at 6). 
At his mid-August, 1990 preliminary hearing, defendant 
was represented by new counsel, Kenneth Brown (R. 114). Mrs. 
Tyler and the fire department investigator gave their accounts of 
the fire and subsequent investigation (R. 114 at 4-10, 11-18). 
Against counsel Brown's advice, defendant testified on his own 
behalf (id., at 20). He denied that he had threatened to burn the 
home (jLd. at 21-22). Defendant said that he had bought some beer 
after the fight with Mrs. Tyler, returned to and briefly entered 
the home, then sat down in the back yard to drink the beer, when 
the fire explosively erupted (id. at 23-24). He claimed that the 
fire had centered around two water heaters in the home (id. at 
24-25). 
The fire department investigator was then recalled to 
rebut defendant's testimony (id. at 32). As he later testified 
at trial, and referring to the photographs he had taken, the 
investigator positively opined that the fire had not originated 
at the water heaters (id. at 32-33; R. 117 at 122-123). 
Accordingly, defendant was bound over for trial (R. 2). 
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After the preliminary hearing, defendant fired counsel 
Brown (R. 93; R. 114 at 31; R. 115 at 6). A second replacement 
counsel, Stephen McCaughey, was then appointed (R. 20-21). 
McCaughey retained a defense investigator at government expense 
(R. 31-34). In order to assure a complete defense investigation, 
he also secured a forty-day trial continuance (R. 118 at 8-9). 
The defense investigator began his work in October 1990, three 
and one-half months after the fire (R. 107). His billing 
statements reflect that his investigation relied upon data 
collected by police and the fire department investigator (R. 87-
88, 107; see also R. 118 at 4). Prior to trial, he met with 
defense counsel McCaughey on at least five occasions, with 
defendant himself at least once, and was present at trial (R. 87-
88, 107). 
Trial took place on November 28 and 29, 1990, not quite 
five months after the fire (R. 117 & 116). The evidence 
supporting defendant's guilt, as already set forth, was produced 
by the prosecution. Through counsel McCaughey, defendant 
attacked the credibility and reliability of that evidence. Mrs. 
Tyler's faulty memory, reflected by her failure to recall how 
long she and defendant had been divorced, was pointed out to the 
jury (R. 117 at 174-75; R. 116 at 63). Her numerous police calls 
to complain about defendant in the months preceding the fire were 
revealed, suggesting a vindictive woman out to "frame" her ex-
spouse (R. 117 at 176-80; R. 116 at 63). Discrepancies between 
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Mrs. Tyler's account of the July 1 police call and the police 
department's call record were noted (R. 116 at 7). 
Additionally, the contradictory testimony of Mrs. 
Tyler's neighbor about the events of July 1 was called to the 
jury's attention. Early in her testimony, the neighbor said she 
did not remember any fight between Mrs. Tyler and defendant; 
rather, she reported that Mrs. Tyler had been visiting with her 
since returning from work (R. 117 at 156). She also reported 
that Mrs. Tyler had used her telephone to report the fire, 
contradicting testimony that Mrs. Tyler had merely called police 
to complain about defendant's unwanted presence (R. 117 at 157-
58). These discrepancies were pointed out in defense counsel's 
closing argument (R. 116 at 61). 
Unable to shake the fire department investigator's 
opinion that the fire had been intentionally set, counsel 
McCaughey acknowledged as much to the jury (R. 117 at 143; R. 116 
at 58). However, he assailed the police and prosecution's 
failure to determine whose fingerprints were on the can of paint 
thinner seized at the Tyler home, beyond determining that 
defendant's prints were absent (R. 117 at 145, R. 116 at 64). 
This, again, was used to suggest that Mrs. Tyler herself had set 
the fire, consistent with the troubled, violent relationship she 
had with defendant (R. 116 at 64-65). 
Finally, defendant himself testified. Contrary to what 
the arresting officers said he had told them, he stated that he 
had been in the Tyler home shortly before the fire, and after the 
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baseball bat fracas (R. 116 at 24). He testified that he smelled 
paint thinner, and saw Mrs. Tyler's paint set in the kitchen (id. 
at 24-25). He said that he picked up some papers from the 
kitchen table, along with Mrs. Tyler's work identification card, 
which fell from the papers as defendant sat in the backyard just 
before the fire erupted (id., at 26). This, again, seemingly 
contradicted the officers' report that defendant told them he 
"didn't know" how he came to be in possession of this item when 
he was stopped leaving the area on foot. He explained his rapid 
retreat from the area as an effort to find a telephone to report 
the fire (id. at 26-27). 
In short, evidentiary inconsistencies and witness 
credibility questions were clearly called to the jury's 
attention. After deliberating for nearly three and a half hours, 
the jury resolved those questions against defendant, returning a 
guilty verdict on the aggravated arson charge (R. 47, 50). This 
appeal ensued, with defendant now claiming that counsel McCaughey 
ineffectively handled his trial defense. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant fails to establish that he was deficiently 
and prejudicially represented by defense counsel. He wholly 
fails to show what standards of counsel performance apply to his 
case, much less that counsel failed to meet those standards. He 
then states that prejudice should be presumed, in clear 
contradiction of controlling law. Such minimal attempt that he 
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makes to demonstrate prejudice is weakly speculative, and falls 
far short of showing an unreliable trial result* 
ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
Defendant has correctly identified Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), as establishing the two-part 
legal test for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel: 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's 
performance was deficient. This requires 
showing that counsel made errors so serious 
that counsel was not functioning as the 
"counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the 
Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must 
show that the deficient performance 
prejudiced the defense. This requires 
showing that counsel's errors were so serious 
as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, 
a trial whose result is reliable. 
Id. at 687 (emphasis added). Utah courts apply this same test. 
See State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 185-86 & n.5 (Utah 1990). 
And, as the emphasized Strickland language shows, defendant bears 
the burden of establishing both elements of an ineffective 
counsel claim. Accord Templin, 805 P.2d at 186. A failure to 
establish either element of an ineffective counsel claim, even if 
the other is shown, defeats the claim. State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 
116, 118-19 (Utah 1989). 
Here, neither element of an ineffective counsel claim 
has been proven. Point One of this brief will show that 
defendant has not established the "deficient performance" 
element. In Point Two, his failure to demonstrate prejudice 
caused by any possible counsel error will be shown. 
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POINT ONE 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT SHOWN DEFICIENT COUNSEL 
PERFORMANCE. 
To make out the "deficient performance" element of an 
ineffective counsel claim, a "strong presumption" that counsel 
performed in a professionally reasonable manner must be overcome. 
Tempiin, 805 P.2d at 186 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). 
Defendant has not overcome this presumption here. 
The gist of defendant's claim seems to be that the 
attorneys assigned to defend him performed "perfunctorily" and 
too slowly (Br. of Appellant at 4-6, 8-9). This claim is 
speculative and conclusory, and therefore fails. 
A. Defense Counsel Adequately Investigated the Fire. 
Defendant argues that his first counsel, Nancy 
Bergeson, inadequately investigated the fire, even though she 
promptly made a discovery request to the prosecution, and also 
had a Legal Defender Association investigator interview defendant 
in jail (Br. of Appellant at 4-5). His admission of these facts 
flatly contradicts his assertion that "Bergeson did nothing for 
the appellant while more than a month passed and the 'scene' [of 
the fire] cooled" (Br. of Appellant at 8). He also fails to show 
that Bergeson's investigatory efforts—or those of counsel who 
followed her—were limited to these measures. 
Apparently, defendant contends that adequate counsel 
would have not only sought discovery from the prosecutor and 
interviewed defendant, but would have also independently 
investigated the crime scene. He supports this contention with 
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no authority. Having wholly failed to demonstrate the existence 
of an "objective standard" requiring such independent 
investigation, Tempiin, 805 P.2d at 186, defendant cannot hope to 
demonstrate that Bergeson's conduct was deficient here. 
Indeed, at least one authority, the American Bar 
Association's Standards for Criminal Justice (1986 Supp.), 
implicitly rejects the investigation standard that defendant 
apparently espouses.2 ABA Standard 4-4.1 requires defense 
attorneys to explore "all avenues" leading to relevant facts. 
However, the standard and its associated commentary emphasize 
discovery from prosecutors and law enforcement agencies; 
immediate "scene of the crime" investigation is not mentioned. 
Counsel Bergeson therefore performed within applicable 
professional standards when she sought discovery of information 
in the prosecution's hands. 
Defendant alleges that counsel Brown, who assumed the 
case after Bergeson withdrew, also failed to investigate the fire 
(Br. of Appellant at 8). There is, first, nothing in the record 
on appeal to show what Brown did or did not investigate. 
Presumably, Brown had access to the information gleaned from 
Bergeson's efforts; defendant mcikes no showing that Brown failed 
to obtain and review that information in a professionally 
acceptable manner. 
2The ABA Standards are identified as an available "guide" to 
assessing counsel performance in Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 
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Defendant's argument that counsel McCaughey's 
investigatory efforts were "too little, too late, [and] 
ineffective" (Br. of Appellant at 9) also fails. McCaughey 
entered the case over two months after the fire (R. 20-21), after 
two prior attorneys had withdrawn. It is absolutely astonishing 
to suggest that his entry into the case under these 
circumstances, clearly beyond his control, was deficiently tardy. 
Further, McCaughey did investigate the fire, retaining an 
independent investigator who examined the best available 
evidence: that collected by the fire department investigator. 
He spent fifty-one hours on the job, including trial time, during 
which he presumably assisted McCaughey in defense examinations 
(R. 87-88, 107). 
Defendant's complaint that none of his defense 
attorneys arranged a direct investigation of the fire scene also 
rests on the dubious premise that they could have gained access 
to it. Mrs. Tyler's private dwelling was burned. Once the fire 
was extinguished and investigated by the appropriate public 
officials, Mrs. Tyler had no obligation to allow anybody else 
into the dwelling. To the contrary, she had every right to 
repair the damage and proceed with her life (R. 117 at 191), free 
from both warrantless official intrusions and unwelcome private 
visitors. Defense counsel, having no right to enter Mrs. Tyler's 
home, can hardly be condemned for failing to inspect it. 
Thus no showing of a deficient defense investigation of 
the fire has been made. Defendant's account of the investigation 
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is speculative at best, and does not overcome the presumption 
that counsel performed in a professionally reasonable manner. 
B. Counsel's Efforts Were Otherwise Reasonable. 
In somewhat scattergun fashion, defendant identifies 
other examples of what he claims represent deficient counsel 
performance. These arguments also miss their mark, and do not 
rebut the presumption of reasonable performance. 
Defendant complains that "[n]o one interviewed 
witnesses while the events [surrounding the fire] were still 
fresh" (Br. of Appellant at 9). The record contains no evidence 
that this is true. However, the non-record memorandum contained 
at Appendix B to defendant's brief on appeal indicates that he 
was interviewed for counsel Bergeson by a Legal Defender 
Association investigator.3 This suggests that Bergeson may have 
arranged to interview other witnesses as well. However, the 
interview with defendant also prompted Bergeson to withdraw from 
the case: the memorandum's post-script indicates that the Legal 
Defender Association was adverse to defendant in another criminal 
matter. If that were so, it would make sense for Bergeson to 
cancel plans to interview other witnesses, and leave that task to 
replacement counsel. 
Defendant similarly provides no record evidence that 
subsequent counsel, Brown and McCaughey, failed to interview 
3Normally, the State would ask this Court to disregard such 
non-record material. See State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296, 297 (Utah 
1986). Here, however, the State waives objection to consideration 
of this memorandum, believing that it actually advances the State's 
position on appeal. 
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witnesses. They, of course, may have obtained witness interview 
notes from their predecessor(s), making further interviews 
unnecessary or even inadvisable. And the record reflects that 
the prosecution complied with defense discovery requests to the 
extent required by law. This compliance included provision of 
police reports (R. 17. 30), which may have included witness 
statements. From those reports, counsel could have decided which 
witnesses needed to be interviewed, and to what extent. As a 
matter of "sound strategy," Templin, 805 P.2d at 186, counsel 
might have decided to not interview certain witnesses until 
trial, to avoid preparing them for impeachment efforts. See also 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (information from defendant may 
eliminate need for further investigation). This could be 
especially true with respect to Mrs. Tyler, given her 
longstanding hostility toward defendant. 
The State is, of course, speculating about what defense 
counsel may have done with respect to witness interviews. 
However, regardless of what counsel did or did not do, the strong 
presumption, again, is that counsel performed reasonably. 
Defendant's naked assertion that witnesses were not interviewed, 
and his failure to show that possible decisions to not interview 
all witnesses fell outside standards of reasonable counsel 
conduct, do not overcome this presumption. 
Defendant also alleges that counsel Brown, who 
represented him at the preliminary hearing, did not speak to him 
before the hearing, and was "ill-prepared" for it (Br. of 
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Appellant at 5, 11). This allegation is supported only by a 
letter from defendant to the trial judge, after the preliminary 
hearing, which resulted in the bindover order (R. 93). It is 
therefore colored by defendant's disappointment that the 
preliminary hearing did not go well for him. That setback, 
however, was arguably due in part to defendant's election to 
testify on his own behalf, against Brown's advice (R. 114 at 20). 
Defendant complains that police dispatch tapes, 
recording Mrs. Tyler's July 1, 1990 call(s) for assistance, were 
not timely obtained. They were sought by counsel McCaughey; 
however, because they are erased after three months, they were no 
longer available when he sought them (R. 116 at 7). These tapes, 
defendant argues, would have clarified whether Mrs. Tyler merely 
called in a domestic dispute complaint, or also reported the fire 
(Br. of Appellant at 9). Perhaps so. However, there is no 
indication that any of defendant's attorneys knew, or should have 
known, that the police would erase their dispatch tapes after 
three months. Seeking them four to five months later, then, was 
not deficient performance; it was adequate performance, defeated 
only by bad luck. 
On appeal, defendant makes much of the "delays" in this 
case (Br. of Appellant at 4-6). However, much delay is 
attributable to defendant himself. The Legal Defender memorandum 
appended to his brief, and information in the record itself, 
clearly reflect his lack of cooperation with counsel, and 
impulsive firing of counsel when events did not proceed to his 
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liking (e.g., R. 75-83, R. 114 at 20, 31). This Court should be 
extremely reluctant to find deficient counsel performance, where 
the client effectively sabotages his or her own case. 
Finally, defendant assails various "failures" to 
adequately impeach prosecution witnesses at trial (Br. of 
Appellant at 9-10). He claims that certain prior "false" 
complaints by Mrs. Tyler, apparently including another arson 
complaint against defendant two months earlier, should have been 
emphasized. In fact, one or two earlier fires were brought to 
the jury's attention (R. 117 at 178; R. 116 at 4). This of 
course was a risky tactic, for the jury was free to believe that 
Mrs. Tyler's earlier complaints were not "false;" arguably, such 
evidence of possible similar conduct by defendant should have 
been excluded. See Utah R. Evid. 402, 404(b), 608(b). 
Further, the State is aware of no evidence that 
"appellant was acquitted of previous false charges" brought by 
Mrs. Tyler, information defendant says should have been presented 
(Br. of Appellant at 10). Nor can the State locate any support 
for the assertion that when apprehended leaving the scene, 
"[a]ppellant had no trace of accelerant's [sic] about him" (id.). 
The possibility that Mrs. Tyler "fabricated" certain 
evidence, recovered by the fire investigator ten days after the 
fire, was brought out and emphasized in closing argument (R. 117 
at 192; R. 116 at 63-64). Defendant's claim to the contrary is 
false (Br. of Appellant at 10). Similarly, the failure to 
identify whose fingerprints actually appeared on the can of paint 
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thinner seized by the fire investigator was also stressed (R. 116 
at 64). In these ways, and in others already set forth in this 
brief, the credibility and reliability of the State's evidence in 
this case was diligently challenged by trial counsel McCaughey. 
In sum, defendant's appellate attack on trial counsel's 
performance does not merely fail to overcome the presumption of 
reasonableness. Alertly examined, it actually reveals that 
counsel performed competently. Accordingly, the "deficient 
performance" element of an ineffective counsel claim is missing. 
On this basis alone, the conviction can be affirmed. 
POINT TWO 
EVEN IF THERE WAS COUNSEL ERROR, SUCH ERROR 
DID NOT RESULT IN PREJUDICE TO DEFENDANT. 
The "prejudice" element of an ineffective counsel claim 
requires defendant to affirmatively show that but for the counsel 
errors, there is a "reasonable probability" that the trial 
outcome would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 
693, 696; State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 118-19 & n.2 (Utah 1989). 
Defendant also fails to make this showing. 
A. The Burden is on Defendant to Show Prejudice. 
Rather than demonstrate prejudice, defendant asserts 
that "the prejudice prong of the Strickland test should be 
presumed here." He refers to "actual" and "constructive" denial 
of counsel in an attempt to support this assertion (Br. of 
Appellant at 8). That language appears to be gleaned from 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692. However, read in context, the 
Strickland reference to "[a]ctual or constructive denial of the 
18 
assistance of counsel," resulting in a presumption of prejudice, 
clearly refers to instances where the prosecution "is directly 
responsible" for the impairment of the right to counsel. Id. 
In the same passage, Strickland expressly states that a 
presumption of prejudicial counsel error exists in only two 
instances: (1) when, as above, the prosecution interferes with 
the provision or functioning of defense counsel, and (2) when 
defense counsel has a conflict of interest. 466 U.S. at 692. 
Neither instance is alleged here, nor does the record suggest any 
possibility of government impairment of defendant's rights. 
Accordingly, even if some counsel error might be found here, 
defendant must show that prejudice resulted. 
B. Defendant's Showing of Prejudice is 
Speculative at Best, and Therefore Fails. 
The prejudice, "reasonable probability" showing must do 
more than show that possible counsel errors "had some conceivable 
effect on the outcome of the proceeding." Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 693; State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). This is 
important here, for the cold record suggests that this may have 
been a close case. Conceivably, any number of factors might have 
caused the jury to resolve this case differently. Strickland and 
Frame clearly teach, however, that this is not enough. 
Further, both Strickland and State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 
182 (Utah 1990), show on their facts that prejudice should be 
demonstrated through a showing of exactly what information would 
have been provided to, or perhaps kept from, the factfinder but 
for counsel's error. In Strickland, specific, potentially 
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helpful testimony not elicited by defense counsel was identified 
to the reviewing court, 466 U.S. at 675-76. Similarly, in 
Tempiin, the potentially exculpatory testimony of an uncalled 
defense witness was identified, 805 P.2d at 188. Such a specific 
showing is critical to demonstrating that counsel errors clearly 
affected "the entire evidentiary picture," id. (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696), and were therefore prejudicial. 
All defendant has done here, however, is to speculate 
that he might have received a favorable verdict had counsel 
performed differently. This is inadequate. See Frame, 723 P.2d 
at 406 (failure to identify content of omitted evidence defeats 
ineffective counsel claim). In some instances, his speculation 
is clearly unrealistic-
Defendant speculates that a defense investigation of 
the actual fire scene might have helped him. There is no showing 
of what information such an investigation might have gleaned. He 
complains of a need for information relating to "[t]he burn 
pattern, the point of origin, the presence or lack of 
accellerants [sic], [and] the possibility of other sources or 
causes of the fire . ..." (Br. of Appellant at 9). However, all 
of this information was gathered and comprehensively assessed by 
the fire department investigator (R. 114 at 11-17, 32-33; R. 117 
at 111-35). 
Defense counsel's investigator spent considerable time 
analyzing the information collected by the fire department 
investigator (R. 87-88, 107). Presumably, the defense 
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investigator was competent (defendant makes no suggestion that he 
was not). Surely, had the investigator found himself handicapped 
by not having visited the scene while it was fresh, this would 
have been brought to the jury's attention. The fact that no such 
argument was presented suggests that the defense investigator's 
use of already-collected data was not a problem; it further 
suggests that the defense could uncover no significant flaws in 
the fire department investigator's work. Defendant therefore has 
made no clear showing that the lack of an immediate investigation 
compromised the defense. 
The complaint about inadequate witness interviews, even 
if such deficiency were shown, similarly contains no glimmer of 
prejudice. Defendant seems to assign this "error" as largely 
resulting in a failure to adequately impeach prosecution 
witnesses (Br. of Appellant at 9-10). However, he has not 
identified any specific information that more witness interviews 
might have provided. He only speculates that State witnesses, 
who were in fact strongly challenged, might have been more 
effectively impeached. It is equally reasonable to speculate 
that further pre-trial interviews might have alerted those 
witnesses about what to expect in cross-examination, making them 
better prepared to rebuff it. 
As to defendant's complaint that counsel Brown 
inadequately represented him at the preliminary hearing (Br. of 
Appellant at 11), any prejudice, again, is speculative. In fact, 
defendant himself, by testifying over Brown's advice to remain 
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silent (R. 114 at 20), probably contributed to the probable cause 
finding and bindover order that resulted from the hearing. 
Certainly his credibility was seriously undermined by his claim 
that the fire centered around the water heaters, followed by 
rebuttal expert testimony that the heaters were undamaged (R. 114 
at 30, 32). It also appears that any challenge to the 
preliminary hearing is mooted by the trial verdict. See State v. 
Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464, 467 n.6 (Utah 1991). 
Finally, defendant complains that the police dispatch 
tapes "would have clarified" whether Mrs. Tyler called police to 
report the fire—thereby supporting the theory that she had set 
it, or whether she merely called to report defendant's unwanted 
presence (Br. of Appellant at 9). Most likely, the tapes would 
have clarified this question to his disadvantage. It was shown 
that police officers were dispatched to Mrs. Tyler's home at 
10:09 p.m., half an hour after she placed her call (R. 116 at 7); 
such a leisurely response seems unlikely for a fire call. The 
confirmed fire call was received at 10:15 p.m., after the police 
officers were dispatched (R. 117 at 109). This is consistent 
with Mrs. Tyler's and the officer's testimony that the initial 
police call was placed only to report the domestic disturbance, 
not to report a fire (R. 117 at 98, 167, 185, 188). As with his 
other allegations of counsel error, defendant has shown no 
prejudice from the failure to secure the dispatch tapes. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant has failed to establish either the "deficient 
performance" element or the "resulting prejudice" element of an 
ineffective counsel claim. For these reasons, his conviction 
should be affirmed. 
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